29 ideas
3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
14329 | Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH] |
8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
9032 | Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH] |
9034 | There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH] |
9035 | If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH] |
9036 | There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH] |
9037 | Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH] |
3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
9033 | Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH] |
3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
9030 | Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH] |
9029 | If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH] |
9031 | The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH] |
8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |