67 ideas
| 11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
| 11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
| 21032 | Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel] |
| 21033 | Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel] |
| 11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
| 11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
| 11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
| 11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
| 11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
| 11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
| 11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
| 11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
| 11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
| 11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
| 14329 | Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH] |
| 11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
| 11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
| 11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
| 11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
| 11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
| 11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
| 11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
| 11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
| 11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
| 11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
| 11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
| 11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
| 11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
| 11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
| 11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
| 9032 | Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH] |
| 9035 | If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH] |
| 9034 | There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH] |
| 9036 | There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH] |
| 9037 | Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH] |
| 11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
| 9033 | Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH] |
| 9030 | Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH] |
| 9029 | If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH] |
| 9031 | The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH] |
| 21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
| 21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
| 21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
| 21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
| 21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
| 21035 | Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel] |
| 21037 | A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel] |
| 21034 | A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel] |
| 21049 | Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel] |
| 21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
| 21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
| 21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
| 21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
| 21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
| 21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
| 21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
| 21045 | Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel] |
| 11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
| 11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
| 11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
| 9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
| 11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
| 11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
| 11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
| 11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |