Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Thinking and Experience', 'Moral Arguments' and 'Evidentialism'

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18 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee]
Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH]
If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH]
There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH]
There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH]
Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH]
If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot]
Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot]
Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot]