Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Thinking and Experience', 'Counterparts and Identity' and 'Causes and Counterfactuals'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH]
If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH]
There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH]
There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH]
Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH]
If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]