16 ideas
| 19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
| 19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
| 19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
| 18006 | Chomsky's 'interpretative semantics' says syntax comes first, and is then interpreted [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
| 8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |