Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Externalism/Internalism', 'Infinitism not solution to regress problem' and 'Ordinatio'

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19 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
16648 Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
15386 If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
15387 If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
16632 We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13094 The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
16770 It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10919 What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16768 Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19712 Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
8836 Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
8837 Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
19703 Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19705 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid]
19706 Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid]
19707 Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19709 Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
19704 Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
19710 With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19711 Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid]