22 ideas
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |