39 ideas
23064 | So-called wisdom is just pondering things instead of acting [Cioran] |
23072 | Systems are the worst despotism, in philosophy and in life [Cioran] |
23075 | A text explained ceases to be a text [Cioran] |
23066 | Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran] |
23077 | The word 'being' is very tempting, but in fact means nothing at all [Cioran] |
5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
23068 | People who really believe anti-realism don't bother to prove it [Cioran] |
5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
23078 | Opinions are fine, but having convictions means something has gone wrong [Cioran] |
23073 | Convictions are failures to study anything thoroughly [Cioran] |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
23076 | If people always acted without words we would take them for robots [Cioran] |
5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
23065 | If only we could write like a reptile, of endless sensations and no concepts! [Cioran] |
23071 | We could only be responsible if we had consented before birth to who we are [Cioran] |
23070 | We morally dissolve if we spend time with excessive beauty [Cioran] |
23074 | In anxiety people cling to what reinforces it, because it is a deep need [Cioran] |
23062 | It is better to watch the hours pass, than trying to fill them [Cioran] |
23069 | Fear cures boredom, because it is stronger [Cioran] |
23067 | Suicide is pointless, because it always comes too late [Cioran] |
23063 | The first man obviously found paradise unendurable [Cioran] |