Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Externalism/Internalism', 'Contextualism Contested (and reply)' and 'Criterion of Validity in Reasoning'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
14779 I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
14777 That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
14780 Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
14778 Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19712 Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19703 Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19705 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid]
19706 Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid]
19707 Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19709 Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
19704 Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
19710 With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19555 People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
19557 Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee]
19556 Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19711 Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid]