50 ideas
17749 | Post proved the consistency of propositional logic in 1921 [Walicki] |
17765 | Propositional language can only relate statements as the same or as different [Walicki] |
17764 | Boolean connectives are interpreted as functions on the set {1,0} [Walicki] |
17752 | The empty set is useful for defining sets by properties, when the members are not yet known [Walicki] |
17753 | The empty set avoids having to take special precautions in case members vanish [Walicki] |
17759 | Ordinals play the central role in set theory, providing the model of well-ordering [Walicki] |
17741 | To determine the patterns in logic, one must identify its 'building blocks' [Walicki] |
17747 | A 'model' of a theory specifies interpreting a language in a domain to make all theorems true [Walicki] |
17748 | The L-S Theorem says no theory (even of reals) says more than a natural number theory [Walicki] |
17761 | A compact axiomatisation makes it possible to understand a field as a whole [Walicki] |
17763 | Axiomatic systems are purely syntactic, and do not presuppose any interpretation [Walicki] |
17758 | Ordinals are transitive sets of transitive sets; or transitive sets totally ordered by inclusion [Walicki] |
17755 | Ordinals are the empty set, union with the singleton, and any arbitrary union of ordinals [Walicki] |
17756 | The union of finite ordinals is the first 'limit ordinal'; 2ω is the second... [Walicki] |
17760 | Two infinite ordinals can represent a single infinite cardinal [Walicki] |
17757 | Members of ordinals are ordinals, and also subsets of ordinals [Walicki] |
17762 | In non-Euclidean geometry, all Euclidean theorems are valid that avoid the fifth postulate [Walicki] |
17754 | Inductive proof depends on the choice of the ordering [Walicki] |
17742 | Scotus based modality on semantic consistency, instead of on what the future could allow [Walicki] |
6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |