16 ideas
| 19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
| 19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
| 6900 | A prior understanding of beauty is needed to assert that the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful [Westaway] |
| 6956 | At what point does an object become 'whole'? [Westaway] |
| 19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
| 19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
| 19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
| 19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
| 19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
| 19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
| 19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
| 19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
| 19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
| 19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
| 7335 | The Chinese Room should be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin [Westaway] |
| 19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |