14 ideas
7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
7535 | If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing [Monk] |