Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic', 'Letters to Frege' and 'Some Models for Implicature'

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18 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes]
Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes]
Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]