Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic', 'The Doctrine of Necessity Examined' and 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
17311 Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10017 Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes]
10018 Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10015 Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10011 Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10016 When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
10027 Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
10026 Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17312 It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10021 It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes]
10022 Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17314 The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
10023 Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
14804 Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
17317 A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
17316 We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
14805 Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
14806 If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
14803 The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce]