16 ideas
21546 | We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell] |
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
21531 | Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell] |
21545 | I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell] |