Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic', 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth' and 'Speaking of Objects'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
23295 Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
23298 Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
23297 The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10017 Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes]
10018 Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
23296 We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10015 Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10011 Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10016 When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
10027 Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
10026 Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10021 It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes]
10022 Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
1630 We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
10023 Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
5747 "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
7925 There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
13387 Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
8277 I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
23294 It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
1631 You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine]
1632 Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine]