34 ideas
| 12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
| 12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
| 10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
| 10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
| 13430 | Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey] |
| 13428 | Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey] |
| 12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
| 10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
| 13427 | Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey] |
| 10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
| 12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
| 10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
| 13334 | Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey] |
| 10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
| 10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
| 10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
| 10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
| 13426 | Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey] |
| 13425 | Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey] |
| 12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
| 10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
| 22328 | I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey] |
| 22325 | A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
| 12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
| 12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
| 12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
| 12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
| 12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
| 12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
| 12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
| 12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
| 12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
| 12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
| 12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |