55 ideas
| 21021 | Keep premises as weak as possible, to avoid controversial difficulties [Nussbaum] |
| 10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
| 10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
| 9542 | The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell] |
| 21720 | Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 10044 | Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| 18208 | We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
| 8204 | Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 9359 | Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 21707 | Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| 10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
| 10036 | In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| 10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
| 10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
| 18248 | A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| 10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
| 18152 | Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock] |
| 10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
| 10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
| 10025 | Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes] |
| 8683 | Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| 10037 | 'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 10093 | The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman] |
| 8691 | The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 10305 | In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 8684 | Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| 8746 | To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| 10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
| 12033 | An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM] |
| 10040 | Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| 21725 | The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| 23474 | A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 23455 | The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 23480 | The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 18275 | Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 21007 | Storytelling is never neutral; some features of the world must be emphasised [Nussbaum] |
| 21025 | Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum] |
| 21026 | Compassion is unreliable, because it favours people close to us [Nussbaum] |
| 21019 | Social contracts assume equal powers among the participants [Nussbaum] |
| 21011 | We shouldn't focus on actual preferences, which may be distorted by injustices [Nussbaum] |
| 21008 | Liberalism does not need a comprehensive account of value [Nussbaum] |
| 21012 | Women are often treated like children, and not respected for their choices [Nussbaum] |
| 21015 | Negative liberty is incoherent; all liberties, to do and to be, require the prevention of interference [Nussbaum] |
| 21017 | Political freedom is an incoherent project, because some freedoms limit other freedoms [Nussbaum] |
| 21016 | Political and civil rights are not separate from economic and social rights [Nussbaum] |
| 21009 | Capabilities: Life, Health, Safety, Mental life, Love, Planning, Joining in, Nature, Play, Control [Nussbaum, by PG] |
| 21010 | Justice requires that the ten main capabilities of people are reasonably enabled [Nussbaum] |
| 21013 | Capabilities are grounded in bare humanity and agency; qualifying as rational is not needed [Nussbaum] |
| 21014 | Rights are not just barriers against state interference; governments must affirm capabilities of citizens [Nussbaum] |
| 21020 | Any establishment belief system is incompatible with full respect for all citizens [Nussbaum] |
| 21023 | We should respect animals in the way that we respect the animal nature in humans [Nussbaum] |
| 21024 | It may be no harm to kill an animal which cannot plan for its future [Nussbaum] |
| 21022 | The Capabilities Approach sees animals as agents, not just as having feelings [Nussbaum] |