Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic', 'talk' and 'Grundlagen (Foundations of Theory of Manifolds)'

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13 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes]
Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Cantor developed sets from a progression into infinity by addition, multiplication and exponentiation [Cantor, by Lavine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinals are generated by endless succession, followed by a limit ordinal [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes]
Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers]