Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic', 'Causation and Supervenience' and 'Oxford Commentary on Sentences'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes]
Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes]
Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley]
Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley]
The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley]
Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley]