21 ideas
17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
304 | Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato] |
16120 | Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato] |
303 | Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato] |
302 | What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato] |
301 | Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato] |
305 | Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato] |