Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic', 'Euthydemus' and 'Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8877 We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
10017 Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes]
10018 Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10015 Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10011 Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10016 When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
10027 Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
10026 Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10021 It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes]
10022 Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
8884 The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
10023 Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
304 Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
16120 Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato]
8878 It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
8880 In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
8881 Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8882 Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
8883 Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
8885 Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8876 Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8879 Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
303 Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
302 What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
301 Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
305 Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]