39 ideas
9786 | Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R] |
9784 | A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R] |
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
15879 | The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré] |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
15891 | Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré] |
15878 | Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
15874 | Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré] |
15884 | Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré] |
15880 | In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré] |
15869 | Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré] |
15881 | We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré] |
15882 | Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré] |
15888 | The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré] |
15887 | 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré] |
15889 | It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré] |
15890 | Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré] |
15885 | The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré] |
15868 | Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré] |
15886 | Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré] |
15864 | Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré] |
15865 | Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré] |
15862 | Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré] |
15870 | Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré] |
15871 | Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré] |
15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
15860 | We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré] |
15867 | Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré] |
15872 | Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré] |
15892 | Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré] |
15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |