17 ideas
16014 | It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan] |
19382 | Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them [Leibniz] |
16024 | I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan] |
16023 | Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan] |
16016 | Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan] |
16017 | Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan] |
16015 | Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan] |
16020 | Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan] |
16019 | Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan] |
16018 | Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan] |
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |