Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person', 'Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton)' and 'Aristotle on Friendship'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron]
A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis]
Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
The Greek 'philia' covers all good and fruitful relationships [Cooper,JM]