Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person', 'Eight Theories of Ethics' and 'Constructibility and Mathematical Existence'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
8758 We could talk of open sentences, instead of sets [Chihara, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
10265 Chihara's system is a variant of type theory, from which he can translate sentences [Chihara, by Shapiro]
8759 We can replace type theory with open sentences and a constructibility quantifier [Chihara, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
10264 Introduce a constructibility quantifiers (Cx)Φ - 'it is possible to construct an x such that Φ' [Chihara, by Shapiro]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
6685 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264 Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
9266 A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267 Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20015 Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
6699 The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6698 Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
6700 We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
6704 Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
6701 Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
6693 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
6691 It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
6688 Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
6705 Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
6690 A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
6689 The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
6706 The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
6709 Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham]