14 ideas
15785 | Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka] |
15786 | Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka] |
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
22410 | Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B] |
22408 | Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B] |
22411 | For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B] |
22409 | We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B] |
22407 | Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B] |