11 ideas
16051 | Life has a new supervenient relation, which alters its underlying physical events [Morgan,L] |
21386 | We should accept as explanations all the plausible ways in which something could come about [Epicurus] |
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
14051 | A cosmos is a collection of stars and an earth, with some sort of boundary, movement and shape [Epicurus] |
1828 | God does not intervene in heavenly movements, but is beyond all action and perfectly happy [Epicurus] |