Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causation in a Physical World', 'Identity and Essence' and 'Disquisitions'

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18 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16668 Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12132 Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
15834 Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
12140 Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11895 A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P]
12141 Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12137 De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12142 Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody]
12143 An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
12144 Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12139 Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12135 Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
12130 a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
12138 Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8404 Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected [Field,H]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8401 Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation [Field,H]
8400 Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones [Field,H]
8402 The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality [Field,H]