11 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
3338 | Numbers have been defined in terms of 'successors' to the concept of 'zero' [Peano, by Blackburn] |
5897 | 0 is a non-successor number, all successors are numbers, successors can't duplicate, if P(n) and P(n+1) then P(all-n) [Peano, by Flew] |
13432 | The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
12696 | Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz] |