Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Recent Debates on the A Priori', 'The Case for Closure' and 'Logical Necessity: Some Issues'

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15 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter [Field,H]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]