22 ideas
10825 | The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H] |
10820 | In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H] |
13499 | Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD] |
10818 | Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H] |
10817 | Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H] |
10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H] |
10827 | Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H] |
16674 | The quantity is just the matter, in that it has extended parts and is diffuse [Charleton] |
23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
10826 | 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H] |
23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
7615 | Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam] |