Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion', 'works' and 'Occasions of Identity'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

40 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
13736 Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
3302 Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
10211 Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
3336 Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
8453 If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
10311 No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale]
10538 Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10793 Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
8466 For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein]
8467 Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
10667 A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
16021 Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
3325 For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
8534 Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
10295 Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro]
3322 Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
6078 Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn]
8479 Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
3751 Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
7970 Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15783 Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
13437 A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
16233 Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
14755 Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16231 Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
15782 Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
2796 For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
8450 Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
3868 To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
4713 For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4712 Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7330 The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
17862 Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog]