12 ideas
17807 | To study formal systems, look at the whole thing, and not just how it is constructed in steps [Curry] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
17806 | It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
17808 | Saying mathematics is logic is merely replacing one undefined term by another [Curry] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
7825 | The politics of Leibniz was the reunification of Christianity [Stewart,M] |