Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Plural Reference and Set Theory', 'Manuscript remains' and 'Modality'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy

21916

Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free [Schopenhauer]

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

5750	Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]

4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC

5737	Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic

5744	First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms

10670

A 'singulariser' converts a plural like 'number of' to a syntactically neutral form [Cartwright,H, by Hossack]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification

5740	Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models

5741	If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts

5735	Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]

5736	No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

5746	The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity

5738	We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality

5732	'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

5739	Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

5734	Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]

5742	In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]

5743	If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]

5749	Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions

5751	The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification

5748	We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

21924

As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer]

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics

21915

To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer]