Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Plural Reference and Set Theory', 'Begriffsschrift' and 'Real Essentialism'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
Frege changed philosophy by extending logic's ability to check the grounds of thinking [Potter on Frege]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
We should not describe human laws of thought, but how to correctly track truth [Frege, by Fisher]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
I don't use 'subject' and 'predicate' in my way of representing a judgement [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
For Frege, 'All A's are B's' means that the concept A implies the concept B [Frege, by Walicki]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Frege has a judgement stroke (vertical, asserting or judging) and a content stroke (horizontal, expressing) [Frege, by Weiner]
The laws of logic are boundless, so we want the few whose power contains the others [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
In 1879 Frege developed second order logic [Frege, by Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Frege replaced Aristotle's subject/predicate form with function/argument form [Frege, by Weiner]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
A 'singulariser' converts a plural like 'number of' to a syntactically neutral form [Cartwright,H, by Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
A quantifier is a second-level predicate (which explains how it contributes to truth-conditions) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
For Frege the variable ranges over all objects [Frege, by Tait]
Frege's domain for variables is all objects, but modern interpretations first fix the domain [Dummett on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Frege introduced quantifiers for generality [Frege, by Weiner]
Frege reduced most quantifiers to 'everything' combined with 'not' [Frege, by McCullogh]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
Proof theory began with Frege's definition of derivability [Frege, by Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
Frege produced axioms for logic, though that does not now seem the natural basis for logic [Frege, by Kaplan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
It may be possible to define induction in terms of the ancestral relation [Frege, by Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Frege's logic has a hierarchy of object, property, property-of-property etc. [Frege, by Smith,P]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier [Frege, by Weiner]