11 ideas
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 21846 | Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
| 14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
| 14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
| 14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 21854 | Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
| 14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
| 14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |