Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Matter and Memory', 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws)' and 'Philosophy of Language'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
13886 Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
9845 We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
10019 Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
15163 The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
15158 Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
15157 Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15156 The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
9886 Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
9889 Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
10553 A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett]
10020 Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
9887 Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett]
8751 Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
21846 Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9891 The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15161 There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
15162 We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
21854 Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9890 The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
11846 If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
15152 To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
15153 Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
15154 We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]