11 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 21846 | Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 21854 | Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8410 | A theory of causal relations yields an asymmetry which defines the direction of time [Reichenbach, by Salmon] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 14935 | The direction of time is grounded in the direction of causation [Reichenbach, by Ladyman/Ross] |