13 ideas
13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
21846 | Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
16050 | The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare] |
21854 | Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
2855 | In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B] |