34 ideas
19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
21846 | Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
21854 | Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze] |
19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |