Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist' and 'On the analysis of moral judgements'

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18 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
10245 One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
3756 Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
3757 Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
3759 You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3752 Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
3753 Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3754 Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3755 Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3761 Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
3760 Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3758 Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
6968 Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer]
6972 A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
6973 Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer]
6974 Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6971 I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
6969 Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer]
6970 Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer]