58 ideas
| 13736 | Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine] |
| 15477 | Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB] |
| 15471 | Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB] |
| 3302 | Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 10211 | Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 3336 | Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 8453 | If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine] |
| 10311 | No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale] |
| 10538 | Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett] |
| 10793 | Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
| 8466 | For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8467 | Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 10667 | A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack] |
| 16021 | Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan] |
| 3325 | For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 15484 | A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB] |
| 8534 | Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong] |
| 15478 | Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB] |
| 10295 | Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 3322 | Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 6078 | Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn] |
| 8479 | Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 15483 | Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB] |
| 15480 | Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB] |
| 15489 | A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB] |
| 15487 | If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB] |
| 15479 | Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB] |
| 15488 | Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB] |
| 15469 | Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB] |
| 15467 | Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB] |
| 15466 | 'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB] |
| 3751 | Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette] |
| 7970 | Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C] |
| 15783 | Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine] |
| 15476 | Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB] |
| 15465 | Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB] |
| 15481 | I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB] |
| 15474 | Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB] |
| 15486 | Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB] |
| 15475 | The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB] |
| 15782 | Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan] |
| 2796 | For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J] |
| 15472 | It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB] |
| 8450 | Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 3868 | To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith] |
| 4713 | For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady] |
| 15492 | Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB] |
| 15495 | Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB] |
| 15493 | Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB] |
| 4712 | Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady] |
| 7330 | The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A] |
| 15485 | Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB] |
| 15491 | Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB] |
| 15468 | Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB] |
| 15470 | Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB] |
| 17862 | Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog] |
| 15482 | We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB] |