13 ideas
| 10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
| 7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
| 7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
| 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
| 2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
| 2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
| 3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
| 2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |