135 ideas
| 20383 | The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche] |
| 4520 | I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche] |
| 4545 | Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche] |
| 4530 | Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche] |
| 4523 | What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche] |
| 4531 | Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche] |
| 4541 | Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche] |
| 20357 | Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche] |
| 4534 | 'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche] |
| 4548 | Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche] |
| 5652 | True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton] |
| 4508 | The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche] |
| 4538 | Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche] |
| 20361 | We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist [Nietzsche] |
| 4533 | Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche] |
| 9916 | Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no! [Poincaré, by Putnam] |
| 20359 | The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche] |
| 2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
| 2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
| 4525 | There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche] |
| 4543 | There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche] |
| 2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
| 4484 | Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche] |
| 4546 | We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche] |
| 4544 | A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche] |
| 20362 | We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche] |
| 16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
| 16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
| 16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
| 4528 | For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche] |
| 13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
| 13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
| 2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
| 4537 | We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche] |
| 2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
| 4485 | Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche] |
| 4487 | A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche] |
| 4539 | The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche] |
| 4529 | All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful) [Nietzsche] |
| 2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
| 2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
| 4532 | We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche] |
| 4486 | The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche] |
| 2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
| 4536 | It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche] |
| 2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
| 2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
| 2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
| 2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
| 2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
| 2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
| 2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
| 2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
| 2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
| 4551 | Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche] |
| 2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
| 4527 | Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche] |
| 2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
| 2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
| 2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
| 20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
| 2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
| 2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
| 2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
| 2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
| 23938 | Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche] |
| 23939 | We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche] |
| 18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
| 14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
| 13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
| 2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
| 13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
| 13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
| 13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
| 13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 4554 | The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche] |
| 4552 | There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche] |
| 4521 | None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche] |
| 4496 | 'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche] |
| 20136 | There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche] |
| 20358 | The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche] |
| 20369 | The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche] |
| 4506 | There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche] |
| 4514 | The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche] |
| 20370 | All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche] |
| 20354 | The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche] |
| 4505 | How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche] |
| 4509 | Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche] |
| 4500 | It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche] |
| 4558 | We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche] |
| 4550 | Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche] |
| 4517 | Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche] |
| 4518 | The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
| 4519 | The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche] |
| 4560 | The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche] |
| 4555 | The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche] |
| 4494 | Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche] |
| 4498 | 'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche] |
| 4493 | Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche] |
| 4511 | We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche] |
| 4512 | Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche] |
| 20372 | The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche] |
| 4510 | A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche] |
| 4515 | Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche] |
| 4516 | Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche] |
| 4559 | When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche] |
| 4557 | The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche] |
| 4507 | The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche] |
| 4501 | Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche] |
| 4489 | If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche] |
| 4513 | Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche] |
| 4504 | Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche] |
| 4495 | The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche] |
| 4491 | In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche] |
| 4542 | Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche] |
| 4553 | We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche] |
| 4535 | A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche] |
| 4497 | The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche] |
| 16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |
| 4488 | Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche] |
| 4502 | Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche] |
| 4499 | Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche] |