Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'The Causal Theory of Names' and 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood'

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12 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
6343 For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9038 We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
5824 How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
9042 A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
10245 One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
5825 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
5823 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
9039 If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
7534 In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
9043 We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
9040 Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]