Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'The Causal Theory of Names' and 'works'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21489 Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19095 Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
19097 Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
21494 If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
21493 Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
19102 Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9038 We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
5824 How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
9042 A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
10245 One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
10352 The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13498 Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
21491 Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16376 The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19107 Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
5825 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
5823 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
9039 If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
9043 We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
9040 Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]