11 ideas
10245 | One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré] |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |