Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Science and Method', 'The Varieties of Reference' and 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22438 Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
22436 Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
22431 Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
22435 The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
22433 It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
22437 Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
22434 Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
10245 One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
22432 Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
12580 Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
7643 We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23794 Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16366 The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12575 Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
22430 If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
13713 Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider]