11 ideas
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
15923 | Poincaré rejected the actual infinite, claiming definitions gave apparent infinity to finite objects [Poincaré, by Lavine] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |